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"SELECTIVE MINIMALISM": THE JUDICIAL PHILOSOPHY OF CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN ROBERTS

Alex D. Silagi
PART 1: Introduction

When the Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court speaks, the country listens.
That is what made John Roberts's opening comments at his confirmation hearing for the Chief
Justice position so surprising. Of all the possible topics to discuss-abortion, gay rights, the
death penalty, etc.-he chose baseball: "Judges are like umpires," he said, "Umpires don't make
the rules, they apply them. The role of an umpire and a judge is critical. They make sure
everybody plays by the rules, but it is a limited role. Nobody ever went to a ball game to see
the umpire." 1
The analogy, though imperfect, was clear. Roberts envisioned a Court different from the
one that existed over the past few decades where, many felt, broad holdings with far reaching
implications were made based more on policy decisions than on the law and facts in the record. 2
To Roberts, the integrity of the Court, if not its constitutional mandate, required much more
restraint. His stated goal was to usher in an era of judicial minimalism; a judicial philosophy
that preferred narrow decisions.

In his usual aphoristic way, he once said, "[i]f it is not

necessary to decide more ... [then] it is necessary not to decide more." 3 He also cared about
how these decisions were reached. The Court was certainly not a political branch; decisions are
based on the law and facts in the record on appeal, and never on empty policy rationales or
results-based jurisprudence. His goals were ambitious, but he was clearly determined.

1

Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination ofJohn G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice of the United States: Hearing
Before S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55 (2005) [hereinafter Roberts Confirmation Hearing].
2
For a survey of the debate over whether the Rehnquist court was minimalistic or actually more broad, see Robert
Anderson IV, Measuring Meta-Doctrine: An Empirical Assessment of Judicial Minima/ism in the Supreme Court,
32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1045 (2009).
3
Chief Justice Says His Goal Is More Consensus on Court, NY TIMES (May 22, 2006) available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/22/washington/22justice.html?_r=O.
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After almost 10 years on the bench, however, a performance evaluation is in order, and
the results are in: he has not hewed to those stated goals. A review of Roberts's opinions
reveals that he is engaged in something different than what he promised. It is an inconsistent
type of minimalism, which I call "selective minimalism." That is, Roberts's adherence to a
limited role of the courts and apolitical decisionmaking has not been a constant star in his
constellation of decisions. Rather, the scope of his decisions, and the rationales that underlie
them, depends on at least two determinative features: (1) whether the conduct or statute at issue
has strong support from a unified front of concomitant branches; and (2) whether the issues
implicate relationships between private citizens and the government, or business interests and
the government. When the circumstances serve those interests, Roberts's minimalism is in full
force; when they do not, his jurisprudential approach becomes less disciplined and takes on a
results-based form that he expressly criticized in his nomination hearings.
A comprehensive inquiry into any Justice's judicial philosophy must look beyond the
court decisions that carry his or her name. Analysis of their decisions can be best understood by
first looking to insight from their life. Part II will begin this inquiry by describing Roberts's
biography. Part III will describe and analyze a representative set of his cases to help explain his
"selective minimalism." It will cover ten cases in total-a spectrum of majority, concurring,
and dissenting opinions-organized thematically by prevalent concepts: standing, crime and
terrorism, freedom of speech, and race. Part IV will conclude by discussing interesting ways to
think of Roberts's successes and failures according to his overarching philosophies.
PART II: Biography

John G. Roberts, Jr. was never mediocre. His life before the Supreme Court, from
childhood to the D.C. Circuit bench, can be best described as a quiet, steady ascendancy to the

2

top of his profession. But the man who would eventually be labeled "one of the great Supreme
Court advocates of his generation," 4 and then the youngest chief justice since John Marshall,
was born in Buffalo in 1955 and grew up in a modest, middleclass life in Long Beach, Indiana. 5
Life around this small, Michigan Lake-side town painted the backdrop for Roberts's
immediate success. His father's job as a steel executive with Bethlehem Steel brought in for the
family enough money to send Roberts to the prestigious all-boys boarding school, La Lumiere,
in nearby LaPorte. 6 He belonged there. As one teacher in his previous school reminisced, he
was always the student through which she could measure her success. She stated, "[i]f he
understood the concept, I was good ... If not, teach it all over again." 7 At La Lumiere, things
were no different. He was valedictorian of the class of 1973. 8 He was captain of the football
team, a varsity wrestler, and member of the student council and drama club. 9 In an early
predictor of his oral advocacy skills, he also excelled at the school's so-called declamation
contest where he would write and memorize his own speeches. 10 He showed an extraordinary
gift for writing. As one fellow student remembered, "[h]e could take an argument that was
borderline absurd and argue for it so well that you were almost at the point of having to accept
his stance even though it was intuitively obvious that it was absurd." 11

4

Adam Liptak, A Career Largely on One Side of the Bench and Involving a Wide Variety of Issues, NY TIMES
(July
20,
2005),
available
at
http://www .nytimes.com/200 5/07/20/po litics/po liticsspeciall /20cases.html ?pagewanted=print&_r=O.
5
JOHN PAUL STEVENS, FIVE CHIEFS: A SUPREME COURT MEMOIR 203 (2011); John G Roberts Fast Facts,
CNN.COM, Mar 25,2013, available at http://www.cnn.com/2013/03/25/us/john-g-roberts-fast-facts/.
6
Todd S. Purdum, Court Nominee's Life Rooted in Faith and Respect for Law, NY Times (Jul21, 2005), available
at http://www .nytimes.com/2005/07/21 /politics/21 nominee.html?pagewanted=all.
7
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8

JEFFERY TOOBIN, THE OATH: THE 0BAMA WHITE HOUSE AND THE SUPREME COURT 8 (2012)
9
Toobin, The Oath, supra note 8.
10
Toobin, The Oath, supra note 8.
11
Todd S. Purdum, Court Nominee's Life Rooted in Faith and Respect for Law, NY Times (Jul 21, 2005),
available at http://www .nytimes.com/2005/07/21/politics/21nominee.html?pagewanted=all.
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Roberts's superb memory and writing skills led him to Harvard College, where he
graduated summa cum laude in 1976, after only three years. 12 During all three summers, he
came home to the steel mill in Indiana and worked as an assistant electrician to help pay for
school. 13 That fall, he entered Harvard Law School and worked his intellect to the same result.
He was selected onto the Harvard Law Review, where he served as managing editor and wrote
two published papers; one on the takings clause, 14 the other on the contract clause. 15 By all
accounts, he was an even-tempered student who, though some students remember as having a
conservative outlook, was never politically active or outspoken about his views. 16 He was
simply "brilliant." 17
After graduating magna cum laude, he accepted two prestigious clerkships. In 1979, he
took a position with Judge Henry Friend, the esteemed judge on the Second Circuit, where he is
said to have learned from Friendly's belief in the limited role of judges. 18 A year later, he
joined then-Associate Justice William Rehnquist where, as he recalled years later, he learned to
shift away from "fluid and wide-ranging" constitutional analysis to more solid ground focusing
on text and precedent. 19
When the clerkship at the Supreme Court ended, Ronald Reagan was elected president,
and Roberts chose to join the administration. 20 He began as an assistant to the attorney general,

12

Stevens, supra note 5, at 204.
Stevens, supra note 5, at 204.
14
John G. Roberts, Jr., Developments in the Law-Zoning, The Takings Clause, 91 HARv. L. REV. 1462 (1978).
15
Todd S. Purdum, Court Nominee's Life Rooted in Faith and Respect for Law, NY Times (Jul 21, 2005),
available at http://www .nytimes.com/2005/07/21 /politics/21 nominee.html?pagewanted=all;
John G. Roberts, Jr., Comment, Contract Clause-Legislative Alteration of Private Pension Agreements: Allied
Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 92 HARV. L. REv. 86 (1978).
16
Todd S. Purdum, Court Nominee's Life Rooted in Faith and Respect for Law, NY Times (Jul 21, 2005),
available at http://www .nytimes.com/2005/07/21 /politics/21 nominee.html?pagewanted=all.
17 !d.
18
!d.; Stevens, supra note 5, at 204.
19
Toobin, The Oath, supra note 8, at 38-39.
20
Toobin, The Oath, supra note 8, at 39.
13
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then moved to the White House counsel's office. 21 While he was far from the highest ranking
in the office, he demonstrated value though his clear and effortless writing style that he would
use with characteristic force throughout his career. For example, when a congressman proposed
a conference to discuss power sharing among the branches, Roberts retorted to his superiors,
"[t]here already has, of course, been a 'Conference on Power Sharing.'

It took place in

Philadelphia's Constitution Hall in 1787, and someone should tell [the Congressman] about it
and the 'report' it issued."22 Similarly, when Chief Justice Burger pushed for an additional
appellate court to lighten the Supreme Court's caseload, Roberts cheekily said, "[w ]hile some of
the tales of woe emanating from the Court are enough to bring tears to the eyes, it is true that
only Supreme Court justices and schoolchildren are expected to and do take the entire summer
off."23
When his tenure with the administration ended in 1986, he briefly joined the prominent
former D.C. law firm Hogan & Hartson but was immediately called back to the executive
branch as a deputy at the solicitor general's office.

24

Between his time there and his return to

private practice, Roberts argued an astounding thirty-nine cases and established himself as one
of the favorites among the justices?5 His successes did not go unnoticed when, in 2003,
President Bush nominated Roberts to a judgeship on the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit, which many regard as a pipeline for potential Supreme Court nomination. 26
He was confirmed by a unanimous senate? 7 Then, after only a short two years on the bench,
the president elevated Roberts again, this time to replace Justice O'Connor, who was retiring
21

Toobin, The Oath, supra note 8, at 39.
Toobin, The Oath, supra note 8, at 40.
23
Toobin, The Oath, supra note 8, at 40.
24
Toobin, The Oath, supra note 8, at 40.
25
Toobin, The Oath, supra note 8, at 40-41.
26
Todd S. Purdum, In Pursuit of Conservative Stamp, President Nominates Roberts, NY TIMES (July 20, 2005),
available at http://www .nytimes.com/2005/07/20/politics/po liticsspeciall /20nominee.htm l?pagewanted=all.
27 !d.
22
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from the Court? 8 But after an ailing Chief Justice Rehnquist passed away just a week after,
Bush announced that Roberts would instead be nominated to take the seat of his former
mentor. 29
At the confirmation hearings before the Judiciary Committee, Roberts shined. As he
had always done for oral arguments, he sat before the row of Senators with no papers, and
answered their questions with an easy erudition showed why he is one of the best advocates of
his time.

Reflecting on Roberts's ability to quote the Federalist papers by memory and

summarize a wide body of case law, one Senator remarked that Roberts "retired the trophy" for
judicial nominees. 30 Most Senators agreed. Roberts championed values that most though
admirable and reasonably attainable: he described his desire for more unanimous decisions, a
narrow role for courts (reflected notably in his umpire analogy), and the importance of
adherence to precedent and the doctrine of stare decisis. 31 He was confirmed on September 22,
2005 by the Judiciary Committee's vote of 13-5, and by the full Senate by 78-22. 32
As with the addition of any new justice to the Court, the dynamics of the nine changed
when Roberts joined. But his role as Chief Justice affected changes that extended beyond
adding a new personality, judicial philosophy, or strategies as would occur if an associate
justice were replaced. Roberts has assumed responsibilities unique to the Chief Justice and he
made alterations in ways that bespeak his personality. Certain obligations of a Chief Justice are
constant: administering the oath of office to the president, presiding over the justices' private
certiorari or voting conferences and open court proceedings, and assigning a justice to author an

28

JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE NINE 323 (2007).
Toobin, The Nine, supra note 28, at 327.
30
Toobin, The Nine, supra note 28, at 327.
31
Roberts Confirmation Hearing, at 55, 141-42, 424.
32
Toobin, The Nine, supra note 28, at 327.
29
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opinion (when the Chief sides with the majority). 33 Where the Chief Justice is given discretion,
however, Roberts parted ways with tradition.

Whereas his predecessor, Chief Justice

Rehnquist, wore a robe with four gold stripes on each sleeve, Roberts did away with such
ostentation and decided to revert back to wearing the same all-black robe as the other justices. 34
That the decision stemmed from the seeds of a unpretentious life is unmistakable. Likewise, he
increased the length of private conferences to allow for more discussion of a case's merits and
reasoning to consider a grant. 35 He is also more forgiving with time at oral argument where,
contrary to Chief Justice Rehnquist' s strict practice of silencing advocates the moment the red
light flashed, Roberts will allow a few comments after time.36
In essence, John Roberts is not William Rehnquist; neither in the sense of procedural
adherence or jurisprudential attitude. But neither is the image Roberts projects to the worldthat of a modest man who wants to get things right while staying out of limelight-a reflection
of his judicial philosophy. To best answer what his philosophy is, one must turn to his opinions.
PART III: Case Studies.
A. Guarding the Courthouse Doors: An Inquiry into Standing.

From his school days in Massachusetts to his days in New York clerking for Judge
Friendly and finally to his life in Washington D.C., John Roberts must have spent countless
hours and miles on the highways that connect those cities. He would have joined the millions of
commuters that travel these roads, their cars and busses spitting noxious gases into the
atmosphere.

Though one might think this environmental issue troubled the Environmental

Protection Agency (EPA), the agency during the George W. Bush administration took no action

33

Stevens, supra note 5, at 44.
See Toobin, The Nine, supra note 28, at 142; Stevens, supra note 5, at 208.
35
Stevens, supra note 5, at 210.
36
Stevens, supra note 5, at 172, 201.
34
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to redress it. From this inaction, the Supreme Court's decision in Massachusetts v. EPA was
bome. 37
In the

early 2000s,

a collection of States, local

governments, and private

organizations alleged that the EPA has abdicated its responsibility under the Clean Air Act to
regulate the emissions of several greenhouse gases. 38 They argued that the previous decade
registered some of the warmest months ever recorded on the planet, that international climate
change research bodies have concluded that greenhouse gasses were causing this climate
change, and the warming posed a threat to people and property if left unchecked. 39 In rejecting
their petitions to act, the EPA reasoned that the Clear Air Act did not give it authorization to
issue mandatory regulations to address global climate change, and even if it could, it would not
because the parties could not show an unequivocal causal link between green house gas

°

emissions and the increase in global temperature. 4

Further, the EPA characterized any

potential action as contrary to the President's "comprehensive approach" to the problem, which
included nonregulatory program action, voluntary private sector reductions in green house
emissions, and more exhaustive research before instituting new regulations. 41
The antecedent issue to these questions, and a critical aspect of the Court's decision, was
the EPA's argument that none of the parties had standing to bring suit because the alleged
harm-the effects of greenhouse emissions-are widespread and therefore too general a
problem to satisfy Article III's "case and controversy requirement."42 The Court, in a 5-4 split

37

549 U.S. 497 (2007).
Jd. at 505. Massachusetts was one of the states that intervened in the litigation after the private organizations had
~etitioned the EPA to act, asserting its injury as the loss of land due to sea level rise. !d.
9
!d. at 510.
40
!d. at 511.
41
!d. at 513 .
42
!d. at 517. As the Court explains, the standing doctrine generally has three constitutional requirements that all
litigants must meet in order for their claim to be justiciable in federal court: (1) an actual, concrete injury in fact;
38
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along ideological lines, held that of all the litigants, at least Massachusetts had standing to sue. 43
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, held that standing was satisfied even though the
regulation's ability to affect change was not entirely certain because "it by no means follows
that we lack jurisdiction to decide whether EPA has a duty to take steps to slow or reduce it. " 44
He added, "Because of the enormity of the potential consequences associated with manmade
climate change, the fact that the effectiveness of a remedy might be delayed during the
(relatively short) time it takes for a new motor-vehicle fleet to replace an older one is essentially
irrelevant.',4 5 Lastly, unlike private citizen suits, Massachusetts is treated differently because
states have a special claim to standing in the federal courts to protect their "quasi-sovereign"
interests in "all the earth and air within [their] domain[s].',4 6
The Chief Justice, writing for a four-j:ustice dissent, disagreed with what he felt was the
majority's expansive reading of the standing requirements. First, in his typical reader-friendly
way, Roberts wrote that, before determining whether the plaintiffs have standing, "the Court
changes the rules" by asserting that states are not normallitigants. 47 This conclusion, he argues,
has no basis in the Court's jurisprudence and is absent from the general judicial review
provisions of the Clear Air Act. He observed that the majority's resurrection of 100 year old
precedent to support the contention is telling evidence that the relaxed-standing argument
needed all the help it could get. 48

(2) causation; and (3) redressability. See id. at 521-526. For the "case and controversy" language, see U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 2.
43
ld. at 526.
44ld.
45 ld
46

Jd. at 519 (citing Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907)).
Jd. at 536 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
48
ld. at 536, 540 (stating that the citation is "an implicit concession that petitioners cannot establish standing on
traditional terms"); Richard Murphy, Abandoning Constitutional Standing: Trading A Rule of Access for A Rule of
Deference, ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS at *16 (Spring 2009) (commenting on majority's decision to rely on such
outdated precedent).
47

9

The heart of Robert's dissent, though, attacked the majority's approach to standing's
"redressability" requirement-i.e., the likelihood, beyond mere speculation, that a decision in
the plaintiffs favor will redress the injury. He wrote,
[e]ven if the regulation does reduce emissions . . . the Court never
explains why that makes it likely that the injury in fact-the loss of
land-will be redressed. Schoolchildren know that a kingdom might be
lost "all for the want of a horseshoe nail," but "likely" redressability is a
different matter. The realities make it pure conjecture to suppose that
EPA regulation of new automobile emissions will likely prevent the loss
of Massachusetts coastalland. 49
The majority's relaxed standing requirement, at its core, allows litigants to use the courts as
forums for policy debates, rather than for deciding concrete issues. 50 The standing doctrine's
limitation on which issues the courts can hear, according to Roberts, "is crucial in maintaining
the tripartite allocation of power set forth in the Constitution. In [his] view, the Court ... fails
to take this limitation seriously." 51
Roberts's dissent reveals a critical aspec1 of his judicial philosophy: the role of the
courts must be a limited one given the narrow standing requirements that the framers put forth
in Article III's "case and controversy" language. Since the doctrine must be considered in any
suit brought in federal court, Roberts's aggressive take on sorting who can and cannot sue
facilitates his minimalist approach to judging. The fewer litigants that have standing, the fewer
decisions the Court will have to address.
Of course, the counter argument adopted by the majority suggests that this narrow
approach imposes an unjustified and unprincipled limit on the availability of the federal
forum. 52 The fundamental fork in the road between the two positions, though, is whether the

49

I d. at 546 (emphasis in original).
Jd. at 547.
51
Jd. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
50

52

ERWIN CHIMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
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79 {4th ed. 2011).

concept of "forum availability" is, in fact, a good thing. For example, a necessary byproduct of
fewer litigants is that the would-be plaintiffs would have to tum to other avenues to redress their
problems-namely the political and executive forums. This separation of powers concept-this
"tripartite allocation of power"-reinforces that notion. Roberts thus puts his faith in the idea
that the concomitant branches can and will redress people's problems and, if not, the people will
see to it that new legislators and executives are elected. Were this basic assumption untrue,
Roberts suggests, the federal courts would necessarily be superior to the coordinate branches.
Given that the separation of powers is premised on horizontal parity, his dissent shows an
unwillingness to accept that proposition.
Behind the academic battle of constitutional norms, however, lies the practical
implications of Roberts's restrictive view on standing.

Roberts, unlike most of the other

justices, came to the Court after successful private practice where he represented mostly large
corporations or entities against individual plaintiffs. 53 Given that the basic strategy for defense
counsel is to dispose of cases as early in litigation as possible, procedural mechanisms like
standing would have been valuable weapons. One can easily imagine how years of arguing for
narrowed standing requirements and benefiting from procedurals roadblocks helped shape
Robert's judicial philosophy in this area. Indeed, his largely pro-business voting positions after
he joined the Court stay true to this viewpoint. 54 Ultimately, Roberts activates his minimalisms
in the standing context and acts as a careful sentinel of the courthouse doors.

53

See, e.g., Toyota Motor Mfg v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002) where Roberts argued, and the Court agreed, that
a Toyota employee diagnosed with carpel tunnel syndrome could not recover damages from Toyota under the
Americans with Disabilities Act; see also Jefferson v. City of Tarrant, 522 U.S. 75 (1997) where Roberts
successfully defended a wrongful death claim against the city brought by the family of a woman who died in a fire.
54
See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (ban on corporations and unions using treasury funds for
independent campaign spending violates First Amendment); Wal-Mart v. Duke, 131 S.Ct. 2541 (2011) (class
action against Wal-Mart for discrimination failed because class did not have requisite common questions of law or
fact); Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S.Ct. 1968 (2011) (Arizona employer ID law not preemp\byl\federal
immigration law).
~
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B. Crime, Terrorism, and Habeas Jurisdiction.

If access to the federal courthouse is important to Roberts in the traditional civil context,
the issue (and his vehemence) is magnified in the context of military detentions. Such was the
case when the Court decided the Guantanamo Bay detainee case Boumediene v. Bush in June
2008. 55 This blockbuster terrorism detention case completed what was a long slog through the
federal courts in the years proceeding the attacks on September 11, 2001. 56 The culmination of
those previous cases-all of which acknowledged certain rights of enemy combatants-was
Congress's codification of two statutes: the Detainee Treatment Act (DTA), 57 which stripped all
federal courts of jurisdiction (except the United State Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia) to hear writs of habeas corpus by noncitizen enemy combatants held in Guantanamo
Bay; and the Military Commission Act (MCA), 58 which holds the same but applies it
retroactively to cover all noncitizen detainees.
Boumediene v. Bush represented the last chapter in a series of setbacks to the Bush

Administration and Congress in the terrorism/detention context. In a 5-4 decision, Justice
Kennedy wrote that the plaintiffs-six Algerian detainees held in Guantanamo Bay--could not
be prevented from filing habeas petitions in federal court because the DTA and MCA's
preclusion of jurisdiction was unconstitutiona1. 59 The majority held that the Constitution's
Suspension Clause 60 is an affirmative right that reaches, and has full effect on, the detainees

55

553 U.S. 723 (2008).
See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (holding that American citizen captured in foreign country
and held as an enemy combatant must be accorded due process); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 723 (2004) (holding that
Guantanamo detainees can have habeas petitions filed heard in federal court).
57
Pub. L. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2739.
58
28 U.S.C. § 2241(e) (2006)
59
Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 771.
60
U.S. Const. Art. I, § 9, cl. 2 ("The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in
Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.")
56
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held extraterritorially in Guantanamo. 61 Moreover, the remedies provided to the detainees
through the DTA and MCA, including the D.C. Circuit's exclusive jurisdiction and deferential
review of "enemy combatant" designations, were not adequate substitutes for the right. 62 The
Court thus stymied what it believed was Congress's attempt to impermissibly circumscribe
habeas review in ways that had full presidential support.
Roberts, writing a dissent joined by Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito, upbraided the
majority for what he perceived as blatant judicial overstepping.

He began the opinion by

bluntly stating, "[t]oday the Court strikes down as inadequate the most generous set of
procedural protections ever afforded aliens detained by this country as enemy combatants. " 63
To Roberts, the decision should have been about context. "The political branches," he wrote,
"crafted these procedures amidst an 9ngoing military conflict, after much careful investigation
and thorough debate." 64 Nonetheless, he continues,
[t]he Court rejects them today out of hand, without bothering to
say what due process rights the detainees possess, without
explaining how the statute fails to vindicate those rights, and
before a single petitioner has exhausted the procedures under the
law. And to what effect? The majority merely replaces a review
system designed by the people's representatives with a set of
shapeless procedures to be defined by federal courts at some future
date. 65
Such a result is not a win for the detainees, as Roberts writes, but rather leaves them with the
prospect of more litigation down the road that forces the unsuited district courts to make

61

Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 771.
!d. at 799.
63
!d. at 801 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
64 !d.
65 !d.
62
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decisions-e.g., what to do with classified information about terrorist detainees-that have
national security implications. 66
The crux of Roberts' dissent turns on his position about the appropriate role of the
judiciary in the military context. Though the stakes may be different than the EPA standing
cases, the underlying philosophy bleeds through. Whereas the Boumediene majority focuses on
what it believes to be "a profound reaffirmation of the rule of law," Roberts sees an unraveling
of the rule of law by an officious institution. 67 As he writes at the outset of his dissent, "[o]ne
cannot help but think, after surveying the modest practical results of the majority's ambitious
opinion, that this decision is not really about the detainees at all, but about control of federal
policy regarding enemy combatants. "68 To Roberts, such policies derive from a realm that the
President and Congress alone have dominion.

And the decision to undermine their

determinations is even more disconcerting to him given the consensus among both of those
branches about an appropriate course of conduct to deal with this unique challenge. Were there
ever a time to take a reserved approach to overruling congressional legislation, the antiterrorism
statutes were prime candidates; as such, Roberts's dissent epitomizes his arguments about the
need for judicial minimalism.
His minimalism also shines through in the criminal law context, where he has shown a
proclivity towards decisions that require case-by-case examinations rather than sweeping
propositions about how criminal law should work. His separate writing in Graham v. Florida
epitomizes this. 69 In 2010, Justice Kennedy wrote the majority opinion in this case, which held

66

Jd. at 826. Here, Roberts's strong yet controlled passion is evident. He is more reserved in expressing the same
sentiment as Justice Scalia, who sharply predicts that the Court's decision "will almost certainly cause more
Americans to be killed," adding hyperbolically that "[t]he Nation will live to regret what the Court has done
today." /d. at 828, 850 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
67
See Chimerinsky, supra note 52, at 390.
68
Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 801 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
69
560 U.S. 48 (2010).
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that imposing a life sentence without the possibility of parole on juvenile offender for a non-

homicide crime violates thG

Amendment. 70 In so holding, the Court announced a

categorical rule applicable to every juvenile that commits a non-homicide offence.71
Roberts, concurring in the judgment, disagreed that the Court had to "invent a new
constitutional rule of dubious provenance" to reach its conclusion. 72 Rather, he would have
held that that the Eighth Amendment requires courts to take the offender's age into
consideration as part of a case-specific gross disproportionality inquiry, weighing it against the
seriousness of the crime?3 The rationale, Roberts indicated, was twofold. First, the context of
criminal sentences calls for a person-specific inquiry into whether the person can eventually be
fit to rejoin society. The jury and the judge are fit to make these determinations on the ground,
and the Court should not undermine or underemphasize their ability to do so.

Second, the

Court's Eighth Amendment precedent answers the question narrowly, without requiring broad
rules. 74 Specifically, he wrote, the Court's decision in Roper v. Simmons drew a1 categorical
line at whether a juvenile could be subject to capital punishment, but its holding did not reach
these types of decisions; instead Roper is valuable for what it did explicitly say, that juveniles
are typically less blameworthy than adults and therefore it should be a major, but not
dispositive, factor. 75
Roberts's concurrence in Graham shows a dedication to narrow decisionmaking in the
criminal context that shares qualities similar to his Boumediene dissent.

The Boumediene

decision exemplifies how Roberts employs a minimalist approach when the majority acts
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contrary to the wishes of the two other branches of government. Those branches, according to
Roberts, are best fit to make determinations about its own treatment of individuals who pose
threats to the nation. The courts should stay away. However, Graham involved a decision by
\ ' c ::A

v'f

certain states to allow life without parole for juveniles, but nowher~he issue implicate the kind
of unified front of branches to which Roberts would feel compelled to defer.

Instead, he

employs a true minimalistic approach by making a decision that is narrow, case-by-case, and

----

shows deference to precedent.
C. First Amendment Protections.

While Roberts was on the losing end of the combatant detention cases, he was
eventually able to draft a majority opinion in a case with overt national security implications;
although, this time, in the surprising context of First Amendment jurisprudence. In Holder v.
Humanitarian Law Project, Roberts wrote for 5 other justices, holding that a federal law

prohibiting material support of terrorist-designated foreign organizations did not violate the
First Amendment as applied to groups seeking to teach and advocate peaceful resolution of
conflicts to such organizations. 76
Based on its finding that certain organizations "are so tainted by their criminal conduct
that any contribution to such an organization facilitates that conduct," Congress adopted a law
prohibiting the provision of "material support or resources" to certain foreign organizations that
engage in terrorist activity. 77 Its definition of "material support" covers a wide range of
activities, some of which clearly relate to illegal conduct and others that seem more
innocuous. 78

Moreover, the Secretary of State has the authority to determine which
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organizations qualify as foreign terrorist organizations. 79 Foil owing passage of the so-called
"material support" statute, several U.S. citizens and domestic organizations that intended to
provide support for the political and humanitarian activities of two organizations labeled as
"foreign terrorists" brought suit. 80 They sued on the theory that, among other things, the
criminal prohibition on providing support to those organizations violate their free speech rights
as a ban on political speech. 81
The Court, lead by Roberts, rejected their arguments and held that such speech could be
constitutionally restricted so long as it was done in connection with a designed foreign terrorist
organization. 82 The majority so held in part because it believed the statute did not reach most
forms of expression. Roberts stated that, under the statute, "plaintiffs may say anything they
wish on any topic. They may speak and write freely about [foreign terrorist organizations], the
governments of [the countries to which these organizations belong], human rights, and
international law. They may advocate before the United Nations."83 It is only the unique
circumstance of "coordination [directly] with foreign groups" that the statute prohibits. 84
The bottom line for Roberts is that, even if certain lawful speech with no imminent
threat is reached, the restriction is permissible given the congressional and executive support for
the statute. He wrote: "Congress made specific findings regarding the serious threat posed by
international terrorism," adding that the majority was relying upon "affidavits stating the

safehouses, false documentation or identification, communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal
substances, explosives, personnel (1 or more individuals who may be or include oneself), and transportation, except
medicine or religious materials." 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(1); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(g)(4).
79
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Executive Branch's conclusion [that] ... 'the experience and analysis of the U.S. government
agencies charged with combating terrorism strongly support' Congress's finding that all
contributions to foreign terrorist organizations further their terrorism. " 85 In words that could
have been taken exactly from his Boumediene dissent, Roberts continues, "[t]hat evaluation of
the facts by the Executive, like Congress's assessment, is entitled to deference. This litigation
implicates sensitive and weighty interests of national security and foreign affairs. " 86 Lastly, in a
clear attempt to show that his rationale should not be confined to First Amendment contexts, he

use~Jthe Boumediene majority's own words against itself by stating, "[w]e have noted that
'neither the Members of this Court nor most federal judges begin the day with briefmgs that
may describe new and serious threats to our Nation and its people."' 87 To Roberts, his
deferential judicial philosophy regarding national security and terrorism was fmally good law,
and he wanted to make sure it would not be caged in.
A troubling aspect of Robert's Humanitarian Law Project decision is its relationship to
past First Amendment jurisprudence. Although he does not address it in his opinion, this case
is the first time the Court ruled that speech advocating only lawful, nonviolent activity can be
criminally punished, even where the speakers' intent is to discourage violence. As Breyer
argues in dissent, "coordination" is not punishable, especially given the longstanding principle
from Brandenburg v. Ohio that the First Amendment "protects advocacy even of unlawful
action so long as that advocacy is not 'directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action
and ... likely to incite or produce such action."' 88 Here, the plaintiffs' conduct is lawful, and
not imminent. Yet, Roberts does not address, or even cite to, this bedrock principle. Moreover,
85
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I d. at 2727.
87
Jd. (quoting Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 797 (2008)).
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he eschews any label of scrutiny, though he acknowledges that intermediate and strict could
have been applicable. 89 Instead, Roberts rejects intermediate scrutiny, and applies a more
"rigorous" test, but never expressly adopts the strict scrutiny language.
Th~

end result shows Roberts engaging in a type of legal gerrymandering to reach a

certain result without confining himself to an analytical framework. There is little doubt that,
had Roberts accepted strict scrutiny outright (as the circumstances persuasively called for it), he
would have placed the government in an uphill battle to defend any future challenges to this
statute or similar national security laws.

And, in doing so, his opaque reasoning leaves

unanswered important questions about the state of the Brandenburg doctrine. For example, his
decision could

arguabf~ support congressional

legislation prohibiting any individual from

lending support to the nonviolent activity of gang members (e.g., youth mentoring programs),
given that those organizations pose serious threats and their apprehension is in the hands of the
executive branch. These are the types of questions that a true minimalist would not have
implicated when the decision did not require it.
That is not to say, however, that Roberts is unreceptive to free speech infringements. As
his majority opinion in Snyder v. Phelps a year later indicates, he has a keen sense of the values
of free speech when national security implications are not at stake. 90 In this emotionallycharged case, the Court refused to uphold punishment of Westboro Baptist Church, an extremist
religious group that protests at the funerals of military service members by waving hate signs. 91
While serving in Iraq, Marine Lance Corporal Matthew Snyder was killed in the line of
duty. 92 His father chose the family's local Catholic Church in Maryland to hold the funeral. 93
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The members of Westboro Baptist Church learned about the funeral and, as they typically do,
picketed a short distance away from the Church gates holding signs that included such phrases
as "God Hates the USA/Thank God for 9/11 ," "Thank God for Dead Soldiers," "Pope in Hell,"
"Priests Rape Boys," "God Hates Fags," and "God Hates You." 94 Snyder's father sued the
picketers for intentional infliction of emotional distress and intrusion upon seclusion. 95
In an 8-1 decision, with Justice Alito as the lone dissenter, Justice Roberts wrote that
liability could not be imposed on the Church, even for engaging in such vicious speech. 96
"Given that Westboro's speech was at a public place on a matter of public concern," he wrote,
"that speech is entitled to 'special protection' under the First Amendment. Such speech cannot
be restricted simply because it is upsetting or arouses contempt." 97 This conclusion was only
possible because Roberts, with almost unanimous support, outlined a broad understanding of
what constituted speech on a matter of public concern. Westboro's picket signs were a matter
of public concern because "the issues they highlight-the political and moral conduct of the
United States and its citizens, the fate of our Nation, homosexuality in the military, and scandals
involving the Catholic clergy-are matters of public import." 98 Given that the state has
alternatives to protect funeral-goers' privacy, like creating buffer zones, "we cannot react to that
pain by punishing the speaker. As a Nation we have chosen a different course-to protect even
hurtful speech on public issues to ensure that we do not stifle public debate." 99
It seems hard to reconcile Roberts's decisions in Snyder and Holder. He would prohibit

those who want to engage in peaceful coordination with organizations to inculcate lawful
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political values, while protecting the rights of religious extremists who intentionally batter
families during emotionally fraught times. The critical difference is that, in Holder, Roberts's
decision was supported by the a unified front of the coordinate governmental branches. Indeed,
in Holder, Roberts rejected arguments that lawful material support would help, not harm,
Congress's initiative because of his excessive deference to Congress's ability to make those
types of determinations on its own. Given that Roberts's Snyder opinion extracts valuable
political discourse from such hateful comments that are at best peripherally related public
debate, there is no other reason to treat differently the plainly political discourse that falls under
"material support."
Another important difference between the two cases is that Snyder involved a private
litigant's suit against another private citizen. But Roberts does not show the same openness to
the protection of speech when a private citizen sues the government, even where the
government is regulating speech in its capacity as a quasi-private actor.
When the government regulates speech in its capacity as an educator, Roberts reverts to
a deference akin to Holder. In Morse v. Frederick, a student arrived late to school and joined
his classmates watching the Olympic torch procession pass by. 100 While he waited, he unfurled
a large banner that read "Bong Hits 4 Jesus." 101 The school principal asked the student to
remove the banner, believing that it encouraged illegal drug use, and suspended the student
when he refused to comply. 102 The student challenged his punishment on free speech grounds.
In an opinion by Roberts, the five-justice majority held that school officials may punish
speech that appears to advocate illegal drug use and, thus, the suspension was permissible. 103
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The Court stated that that those who viewed the banner would understand it to be advocating
and promoting illegal drug use. 104 In its view, the words on the banner could be taken as an
invitation to smoke marijuana or as a celebration of drug use. 105 Puzzlingly though, whereas
"Westboro's signs plainly relates to public ... matters," 106 here, Roberts stated that the words
bear no political or religious meaning-that is, "this is plainly not a case about political debate
over the criminalization of drug use or possession." 107 Accordingly, the protections afforded to
the banner's expressions were limited.
But this limitation notwithstanding, the banner did not fall cleanly into any of the
Court's carve outs from First Amendment protection in the school speech context. As Roberts
recognizes, up to that point, the Court had generally recognized three circumstances where the
school can prohibit student speech: first, where speech causes a material disruption; 108 second,
where speech is lewd and lacks a political message; 109 and third, where speech is school
sponsored. 110 Here, the student's banner does not fit well into any one.

Faced with two

options-either adhere to the doctrine, reversing the punishment that does not fall under any
exception, or create a new judge-made carve out-Roberts chose to reshape the doctrine by
creating a fourth exception for speech that advocates illegal drug use. This plainly was an act of
policy-based decisionmaking.
The reason why Roberts would engage In such an awkward twisting of precedent
becomes more clear when he explains what drives the school-drug issue. He writes, "Congress
has declared that part of a school's job is educating students about the dangers of illegal drug
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use. It has provided billions of dollars to support state and local drug-prevention programs." 111
Pursuant to those ends, "[t]housands of school boards throughout the country ... have adopted
policies aimed at effectuating this message. " 112
Robert's own history likely worked the tipping point in the decision. A student of
unmatched capabilities throughout his educational life, he always kept his schooling at the front
of his thoughts. As a high school student at La Lumiere School, he was inculcated with the
values of academic excellence upon which the institution was built. 113

The traditional

curriculum he received there mixed with his punctilious view of schooling were worlds apart
from the types of students who would unfurl "Bong Hits 4 Jesus" banners merely to gain
attention. 114 Even at Harvard undergraduate and law school, Roberts arrived there when the
Cambridge campus was no longer the radicalized bastion of liberalism that it had been in the
late '60s, where the campus would have been littered with protests and banners, and he left
before the campus was deeply divided over legal studies in the '80s. 115 The totality of this
educational upbringing placed Roberts firmly in support of laws that preserve discipline and
order within the schools; and therefore,

his deferential approach to the government as educator

is unsurprising.
But Roberts's lack of restraint in Morse cuts against the commitments he made at his
senate hearing, and he casts even more doubt in the Citizens United v. Federal Elections
Committee decision. 116 The Court notoriously overruled its previous precedent and struck down
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part of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act's restrictions on independent expenditures by
corporations to get candidates elected or defeated. 117
In the decades leading up to the decision, the Court had made several key
pronouncements about corporate political speech: first, corporations possess free speech
rights; 118 second, expenditures in election campaigns are core political speech; 119 and third,
corporations can spend money in election campaigns, but the money must be raised in a
separate account from its corporate fund. 120 The third pronouncement, which the Court decided
l

in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce in 1990, was the focus fn Justice Kennedy's
majority decision in Citizens United. In expressly overruling Austin, Kennedy wrote, "[n]o case
before Austin has held that Congress could prohibit independent expenditures for political
speech based on the speaker's corporate identity," adding, "[p]olitical speech is indispensible to
decisionmaking in a democracy, and this is no less true because the speech comes from a
corporation rather than an individual." 121 Accordingly, the rationale behind Austin was rejected
and the provision of the Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act modeled after it was held
unconstitutional.
Roberts's concurrence is notable for his characterization of the majority's break from its
previous precedence.

His opinion is largely devoted to "important principles of judicial

restraint and stare decisis implicated in this case. " 122 Although neither party required Austin to

117

2 U.S.C. § 441b (2002), overruled by Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
See First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776-77 (1978) ("The inherent worth of the speech
in terms of its capacity for informing the public does not depend upon the identity of its source, whether
corporation, association, union, or individual.").
119
See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976) (stating that "[a] restriction on the amount of money a person or
group can spend on political communication during a campaign necessarily reduces the quantity of expression by
restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience reached").
120
See Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990) (reasoning that the regulation
"ensures that expenditures reflect actual public support for the political ideas espoused by the corporation").
121
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 349 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
122
Jd. at 373 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
118

24

be overruled in order to decide the case, the majority nonetheless took a more aggressive
approach that reached its earlier decision. 123 Roberts felt that----contrary to his principles of
restraint-this aggressiveness was warranted because "we cannot embrace a narrow ground of
decision simply because it is narrow; it must also be right." 124 But it is far from clear that the
only difference between reaching or avoiding the constitutional issue is a matter of judicial
accuracy. For one, the Court had upheld the same provision just 7 years earlier in McCone II v.
Federal Election Commission; 125 a critical difference over those years is not a major shift in the

campaign financing world, but rather Justice Alita replaced a retiring Justice O'Connor (a
majority vote in McConnell). Moreover, in his own 2007 majority opinion, Federal Election
Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Roberts refused to overrule the provision, as well. 126 If
Wisconsin Right to Life was wrong, then he should have declared it so then; if the decision was

right then, nothing materially changed since to suddenly render Citizens United correct. On the
other hand, if Roberts was merely using Wisconsin Right to Life as a way to limit precedent
before he jettisoned it outright-in that case he defmed the types of ads that would fall under
the regulation so broadly as to render the definition virtually meaningless-then he was merely
making a disingenuous distinction that Scalia accused of being "faux judicial restraint." 127
These types of inconsistent decisions go directly against the grain of Roberts's stated
goals to ensure steady, predictable decisionmaking. That is not to say that justices can never
change their minds-indeed, sometimes new approaches result in better decisions. But what it
does suggest is that those fundamental aspects of precedence, like settled expectations,
predictability, and unworkability, are ignored when the Court moves so radically back and forth
123
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over a mere course of years, and threatens the integrity of the Court. The deleterious effects
will soon be felt. Take, for example, the Court's upcoming decision in McCutcheon v. Federal
Election Commission, regarding whether the court will strike down aggregate contribution

limitations. The result in Citizens United strongly suggest that the same majority will render the
limitation unconstitutional. Such a result may be right, but that is not the point. Rather, the
point is that the integrity of the institution will be harmed because the constant vacillations over
the past few years, and over the past few decisions, will inevitably give the appearance that the
Court is making a political decision. Roberts's decisions will have facilitated that result.
D. Decisions with Overt Racial Implications:

Roberts's decision in the First Amendment context are problematic for their lack of
consistent minimalism.

In the context of racial issues, however, Roberts's jurisprudential

approach takes on a rogue form, entirely devoid of the intended markers for his tenure.
Specifically, his decisions involving race and discrimination have been reached without the
slightest concern for consensus, minimalism, or adherence to stare decisis.
Roberts wrote the majority opinions in two pivotal 5-4 decisions (with numerous
concurrences and dissents) that had overt racial implications.

In Parents Involved in

Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, Roberts wrote for the majority that struck

down a school district's consideration of race in assigning students to public schools in order to
increase racial integration. 128 In the context of voting rights, he wrote the majority opinion in
Shelby County v. Holder, where the Court struck down § 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965,

which identified states with histories of race-based voter suppression that have to get approval
from federal authorities before making changes to their voting procedures. 129
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In Parents Involved, several school districts adopted plans to include race as a one of
many factors when deciding which students would be assigned to certain schools. In addition to
other factors including family members and neighbors attending the school, the school
considered whether the student applicants would help it achieve greater racial diversity. Some
of the school systems voluntarily imposed the plans after judicial desegregation orders were
lifted; others imposed the plans without any history of discrimination.
Roberts, writing for a four-justice plurality, found that the school districts failed strict
scrutiny because diversity in primary and secondary school classrooms was not a compelling
governmental interest. 130 He stated, "[t]o the extent the objective is sufficient diversity so that
students see fellow students as individuals rather than solely as members of a racial group, using
means that treat students solely as members of a racial group is fundamentally at cross-purposes
with that end." 131 In his view, racial balancing is unequivocally an unconstitutional end, not a
question of verbiage.
Roberts's position 1s derived from his misguided vtews about the importance of
diversity, the pernicious effects of racism, and twisting of the Court's precedence. Regardless
of the school boards' opinions on the matter (a complete about-face from his deference to local
school policy-makers in the "Bong Hits 4 Jesus" case), Roberts's believed that the Court had
already decided this issue in Brown v. Board ofEducation:
Before Brown, schoolchildren were told where they could and
could not go to school based on the color of their skin. The school
districts in these cases have not carried the heavy burden of
demonstrating that we should allow this once again-even for very
different reasons ... [T]he way "to achieve a system of determining
admission to the public schools on a nonracial basis," is to stop
assigning students on a racial basis. 132
130
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In his epigrammatic way, he concluded, "[T]he way to stop discrimination on the basis of race
is to stop discriminating on the basis ofrace." 133
The dissent was outraged. Rightfully so. Roberts's reliance on Brown was a "cruel
irony," as Justice Stevens wrote. 134 Roberts had taken the promises guaranteed by the Equal
Protection clause and upended them, conflating the idea of racial segregation with racial
integration. This distortion of precedent ignores the context behind the desegregation cases and
the march toward civil rights, turning the concept of racial equality into a game of mere
wordsmithing. Moreover, Roberts's "colorblind" approach to the constitution implicated the
Court's other racial diversity cases, including Gruffer v. Bollinger. 135 Justice Stevens pointedly
noted that "[t]he Court has changed significantly ... It was then more faithful to Brown and
more respectful of our precedent than it is today. It is my firm conviction that no Member of
the Court that I joined in 1975 would have agreed with today' s decision." 136 Justice Breyer,
reading aloud from the bench the day the Court announced its opinion, asked, "[w]hat about
stare decisis ... ? [W]hat of the hope and promise ofBrown?" 137 Then, in a line Breyer did not
include in his written opinion, he added, "It is not often in the law that so few have so quickly
changed so much." 138 The comment struck Justice Alito, who stared across the room at Breyer,
but Roberts stayed expressionless, his teeth visible clenched. 139
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Civil right groups shared Breyer's outrage but not his surprise at the decision because
they closely tracked Roberts's position on racial issues during his nomination. 140 They were
likewise not surprised by his aversion to the Voting Rights Act. During his younger years in the
Reagan Administration, he was a strong voice in the internal debate over Congress's plans for
the Act. 141 Roberts cautioned in one memo among many that looser standards would "provide a
basis for the most intrusive interference imaginable by federal courts into state and local
processes." 142 Twenty years later, however, when he was questioned about the memo during
his confrrmation hearings, he maintained that he was merely advising his client and ensured that
he would have an open mind. 143
Not so. When Roberts penned the majority decision in Shelby County v. Holder in 2012,
he engaged in one of his most outwards shows of judicial reaching since he became Chief
Justice. The decision struck down §4(b) of the Act, which dictated a formula that those states
that engaged in certain types of race-based voter discrimination in the 1960s would be subject to
preclearance requirements.

He did so, he said, because the "extraordinary measures" that

required the imposition of the Act on those southern states no longer existed, even though, as he
acknowledged, race-based voting discrimination still exists today.
Roberts's conclusion could not have been based on fact. The history of the Act up to its
recent reauthorization showed overwhelming evidence that voting rights still needed protection.
As Justice Ginsburg noted in dissent, over two years, the House and Senate Judiciary
Committees held numerous hearings, interviewed witnesses, and received reports showing
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countless "examples of flagrant racial discrimination" in covered jurisdictions. 144

The

Reauthorization passed the House by a vote of 390-to-33; the Senate, 98-to-0. 145 President
Bush signed the reauthorization a week later, recognizing the need for "further work ... in the
fight against injustice." 146
In the face of this unified front of coordinate branches, Roberts simply did not see the
issue of "extraordinary circumstances" in the same light. Instead of accepting Congressional
and Presidential determinations, he imposed his own value judgment.

In the name of

federalism, he stated, "while any racial discrimination in voting is too much, Congress must
ensure that the legislation it passes to remedy that problem speaks to current conditions." 147 As
he bluntly put it, "[o]ur country has changed." 148 But his authority for such a bold proposition
cannot be Congress or the Executive branch, given their findings; instead, Roberts is suggesting
that ·the segregation era, astounding for its overt racism, is dead and therefore the remedial
measures that came about because of that era cannot be permissible post-burial.
To realize how dramatically Roberts departed from his ordinary framework, it is helpful
to compare the decision to another recent Court opinion of great social import.

In,

United

States v. Windsor, a woman named Thea Spyer passed away in 2009 in New York. 149 Spyer left

her entire estate to her partner, a woman named Edith Windsor, to whom Spyer married in a
lawful ceremony in Ontario a few years earlier. 150 Unlike most opposite sex spouses, however,
Windsor was unable to claim an estate tax exemption because of a federal law, the Defense of
Marriage Act (DOMA), "which excludes a same-sex partner from the definition of 'spouse' as
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that term is used in federal statutes." 151 The majority, lead by Justice Kennedy, held that
DOMA was unconstitutional.

He wrote, "DOMA violates basic due process and equal

protection principles ... The avowed purpose and practical effect of the law here in question are
to impose a disadvantage, a separate status, and so a stigma upon all who enter into same-sex
marriages made lawful by the unquestioned authority of the States." 152
In a short dissent, Roberts stated that he could not find an unconstitutional basis for the
statute because of the overwhelming congressional and executive support at the time it was
passed. 153 When DOMA was passed, according to him, it could not have been unconstitutional
because "[i]nterests in uniformity and stability amply justified Congress's decision to retain the
definition of marriage that, at that point, had been adopted by every State in our Nation, and
every nation in the world." 154 "At least without some more convincing evidence that the Act's
principal purpose was to codify malice," he continues, "and that it furthered no legitimate
government interests, I would not tar the political branches with the brush of bigotry." 155 This
deference stands in stark contrast to his disregard of a comprehensive congressional record in
Shelby County; and it evidences that the policy-based decision-making Roberts uses in racial

contexts are stunning, even if cabined to this unique context.
Part IV: Conclusion.

At the end of the day, the ultimate question is whether Roberts's "selective minimalism"
is a good thing, a bad thing, or somewhere in between. Most of his detractors would see this as
unequivocally bad, and use as evidence his harmful decisions involving race and campaign
finance. His supports would see the opposite. They would see a common core of values that
151
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Roberts generally applies to his cases, but when such application is not possible, he uses his
logic and understanding of the world to make the best decision.
Both answers oversimplify the situation. In one aspect, Roberts's judicial approach is
unjustifiable-the context of race. His decisions in Shelby County and Parents Involved seem
to take no consistent approach at all, as Roberts turns his misguided worldview into judge-made

/

~.

law. But in the other contexts, it is less clear whether his varying applications of restra~ and as t . _
harmful. Indeed, it is somewhat unfair to force upon any person, let alone a justice, a singular
label or one unitary philosophy. In most contexts, like standing and terrorism or criminal law,
Roberts has a consistent~f deference and restraint in his opinions. In the First Amendment
context, Roberts adheres to his approach when he can, but he is inevitably guided to more
subjective and selective applications when the facts directly run afoul of his moral compass, as
informed by his background experiences-e.g., student speech and discipline. In conclusion,
whether one agrees that his approach to minimalism is helpful or harmful, it is undeniable one
thing-selective.
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